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ABSTRACT
The Sue-and-Settle Phenomenon: It’s Impact
On the Law, Agency, and Society

by
Katie L. Colton, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2018
Major Professor: Dr. Christopher Fawson
Department: Economics
Sue-and-settle is the name applied to a federal agency’s use of litigation to create
policy outside of the normal regulatory process. This paper discusses the impact that the
sue-and-settle policy has had on Congress, the judiciary, and the Environmental
Protection Agency. First, this paper examines whether a collusive relationship occurs
between the litigants. A sample set of 670 suits filed against the EPA from 2000-2010 is
used to establish the relationship of the litigants. This paper presents the idea that some
type of collaboration occurs between the parties. A binary choice model is used to
explain the statistical correlation that exists. The paper models the data using logit, probit,
and linear probability models. The paper then discusses whether the relationship between
the litigants in sue-and-settle cases tends to be collusive or not. The second part of the
paper examines how Congress, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the judiciary
are viewed because of the continued perception of collusion in the agency’s settlements.
Overall, this paper finds that, the impacts of the sue-and-settle policy, and the perception
of collusion, has affected Congress, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the
judiciary by increasing regulation, distorting the purpose of the courts, which results in a
lost value for the regulatory process.
(74 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT

Sue-and-settle: Impact on Law,
Agency, and Society.
Katie L. Colton

Sue-and-settle is the name applied to a federal agency’s use of litigation to create
policy outside of the normal regulatory process. This paper discusses the impact that the
sue-and-settle policy has had on Congress, the judiciary, and the Environmental
Protection Agency. Specifically, this paper will discuss the issues caused by the
perception of collusion within the sue-and-settle policy. First, this paper examines
whether a relationship occurs between the litigants. The paper then discusses whether the
relationship between the litigants in sue-and-settle cases tends to be collusive or not. The
second part of the paper examines how Congress, the Environmental Protection Agency,
and the judiciary are viewed because of the continued perception of collusion in the
agency’s settlements. Overall, this paper finds that, the impacts of the sue-and-settle
policy, and the perception of collusion, has affected Congress, the Environmental
Protection Agency, and the judiciary by increasing regulation, distorting the purpose of
the courts, and resulting in a lost value for the regulatory process.
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INTRODUCTION

On October 16, 2017 the newest Director of the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), Scott Pruitt, ended a long-standing “sue-and-settle” practice that the agency
utilized in previous administrations. In his letter to the EPA, Director Pruitt stated that the
process previously used by the EPA to settle litigation through consent decrees and
settlement agreements led to the appearance of collusion between the agency and outside
groups. The settlement agreements relinquished “some of its discretion over Agency’s
priorities and hand[ed] them over to special interests and the courts.”1
This was not the first time that the policy of sue-and-settle came under scrutiny.
During the Reagan administration (March 1986), the Department of Justice established a
policy that prohibited agencies from entering into settlement agreements that “interfere
with [agency] authority to revise, amend, or promulgate regulations.”2 The Reagan
administration claimed that past administrations had abused the ability to enter into
settlements, similar to how Pruitt has viewed the previous administration.3 Critics of the
policy claim that the practice of sue-and-settle limits Congressional power and removes
Congressional oversight. Critics also argue that sue-and-settle excludes interested
stakeholders, intervenors, and affected states from partaking in discussions that were
critical to regulation and policy changes. Others, however, have argued that the sue-and-

1

Pruitt, Scott. "Administrator Pruitt Issues Directive to End EPA "Sue & Settle"." EPA. October 16, 2017.
Accessed May 06, 2018. https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/administrator-pruitt-issues-directive-end-epasue-settle.
2
“Meese” Memorandum from the Attorney General Edward Meese III, Department Policy Concerning
Consent Decrees and Settlement Agreements (March 13, 1986).
3
Ibid.

2
settle policy helps move regulatory discussions that would otherwise happen behind
closed-doors, out into the open.4
Sue-and-settle is not a new policy, nor is it a policy that only applies to
environmental groups.5 Both industry and interest groups have lobbied and sued
Congress and agencies to gain preferential regulation.6 The question of whether the
groups participating in sue-and-settle are colluding or not is discussed within this paper.
Collusion is the idea that the EPA invites certain groups to sue the agency to create
regulation. Though no evidence is found to support the claim of collusion, there is
evidence of a correlation between special interest groups, settlement occurrence, and the
amount of attorney fees obtained. As discussed later in this paper, there are a variety of
reasons why such a relationship would occur other than collusion, such as the type of
suits litigated. However, despite no proof of collusion, the perception of a conspiracy
between the plaintiffs and the EPA remains. It is this notion of deceit that creates societal
concerns. The impacts of the sue-and-settle policy, and the perception of collusion, has
affected Congress, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the judiciary by increasing
regulation, distorting the purpose of the courts, which results in a lost value for the
regulatory process.

4

Tyson, Ben. "An Empirical Analysis of Sue-and-Settle in Environmental Litigation." Virginia Law
Review. Nov. 2014. Accessed May 02, 2018, http://www.virginialawreview.org/volumes/content/empiricalanalysis-sue-and-settle-environmental-litigation.
5
Johnson, Stephen M., Sue and Settle: Demonizing the Environmental Citizen Suit (June 14, 2014). Seattle
University Law Review 2014, vol. 37, no. 891, pg.892. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2478866.
6
Kovacs, William L., Keith W. Holman, and Jonathan A. Jackson. "Sue and Settle: Regulating Behind
Closed Doors." U.S. Chamber of Commerce. May 2013, pg.14. Accessed May 06, 2018.
https://www.uschamber.com/report/sue-and-settle-regulating-behind-closed-doors.
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The first part of this paper will define sue-and-settle and its process. Then this
paper will establish the relationship that occurs between the EPA and the litigation
plaintiffs and debate whether the relationship is a form of collusion. The final section of
this paper will discuss the various effects of the policy on the regulatory process and law.

WHAT IS SUE-AND-SETTLE?

Sue-and-settle is the process by which a federal agency agrees to a settlement
agreement with an advocacy group, designed to create regulations and deadlines outside
the normal rulemaking process.7 The settlement agreement usually results in a consent
decree8 that binds the agency to resolve the plaintiffs’ claims.9 Settlement agreements are
often negotiated in closed meetings with no, or few, participation from other affected
parties or the public at large. The results can have large regulatory and financial
implications. From 2005 to 2016, the EPA implemented regulation from lawsuits costing
taxpayers an estimated $68 billion, of which $26 billion were annual costs.10 The practice
of sue-and-settle is commonly used for regulations tied to the Clean Air Act, the Clean

7

The two types of sue-and-settle cases are decision forcing (deadline suits) and decision making (also
known as rulemaking suits.
8
Consent decrees and settlements are functionally the same. Consent decrees are settlement agreements
given the force of law by court order. Settlement agreements take their force from the law of contracts.
9
Voyles, Travis, “Clearing Up Perceived Problems with the Sue-and-Settle Issue in Environmental
Litigation.” Journal of Land Use & Environmental Law 2016, vol. 31, no. 2. Accessed Oct. 02, 2018,
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2927518.
10
Bedard, Paul, and Pablo Martinez Monsivais. "Regulatory Scheme Killed by EPA's Scott Pruitt Cost
Taxpayers $68 Billion." Washington Examiner. October 24, 2017. Accessed May 06, 2018.
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/regulatory-scheme-killed-by-epas-scott-pruitt-cost-taxpayers-68billion/article/2638414.
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Water Act, and the Endangered Species Act; all of which fall under the Environmental
Protection Agency’s jurisdiction. As such, this paper will focus solely on the EPA.
From 2008 to 2016, the number of suits filed against the EPA and subsequently,
settlements, increased dramatically. The two-term Clinton administration engaged in 27
sue-and-settle cases under the Clean Air Act. During the two-term Bush administration
there were 66.11 A Chamber of Commerce report states that, in the Obama
administration’s first-term alone, 60 sue-and-settle cases were negotiated. Overall, in the
two terms of the Obama presidency, (2009-2016), 137 cases were settled.12 Figure 1
shows the amount of cases by each presidential term.13 Figure 2 shows how over time the

11

Kovacs, William L., Keith W. Holman, and Jonathan A. Jackson. "Sue and Settle: Regulating Behind
Closed Doors." U.S. Chamber of Commerce. May 2013. Accessed May 06, 2018.
https://www.uschamber.com/report/sue-and-settle-regulating-behind-closed-doors.
12
Kovacs, William L., Keith W. Holman, Joseph J. Johnson, and Jordan Crenshaw. "Sue and Settle
Updated: Damage Done 2013-2016." U.S. Chamber of Commerce. May 2017. Accessed May 06, 2018.
https://www.uschamber.com/report/sue-and-settle-updated-damage-done-2013-2016.
13
Kovacs, William L., Keith W. Holman, and Jonathan A. Jackson. "Sue and Settle: Regulating Behind
Closed Doors." U.S. Chamber of Commerce. May 2013. Accessed May 06, 2018.
https://www.uschamber.com/report/sue-and-settle-regulating-behind-closed-doors.
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Figure 2: Lawsuits Against the EPA by Year
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The data taken for Figure 2 is from the Bloomberg Law Database analysis.
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"Environmental Litigation:
Impact
Deadline Suits
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Rulemaking
Is Limited." U.S.
Government Accountability Office (U.S. GAO). January 14, 2015. Accessed May 06, 2018.
https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-34.
16
Sunshine for Regulatory Decrees and Settlements Act of 2015, House Report 114-184, June 25, 2015,
Figure
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Lawsuits
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114-1, S. 378, 114th Cong.,
Senator
Chuck
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agency would require the agency to revisit its settlement agreement until the comment
could be resolved.17 While the bill did not pass (it was tabled in the judiciary committee),
it brought attention to the problems that the increase in settlement suits had caused.
One such problem is the burden that regulatory action has placed on different
industries through sue-and-settle cases. The American Action Forum released a report
that analyzed the White House’s public database of economically significant rulings. The
report shows that from 2005 to 2016, 23 sue-and-settle rules cost $67.9 billion, with an
annual cost of $26.5 billion. Of those 23 cases, 16 imposed a paperwork burden of 8
million hours.18 Additionally, the sue-and-settle process has a large impact on how policy
is implemented. Rather than going through the proper channels, sue-and-settle can result
in backdoor regulations and reduced transparency. This can influence the court system
and cultivate a culture of diminishing respect for the political process. The effect of sueand-settle on law and policy implementation is further discussed later in this paper.

THE SUE-AND-SETTLE PROCESS

The process for a civil court case is mostly straightforward; yet, it can still take
years for a case to reach a final outcome. The process begins when a plaintiff files a

17

Most of the comments submitted by the business community in previous settlements were
overwhelmingly rejected by the EPA on the major rules that resulted from sue-and-settle agreements. Thus,
the bill hoped to change the EPA’s behavior regarding comments.
18
Bosch, Dan. "EPA's Sue and Settle Directive: A Step Toward Transparency." American Action Forum.
October 24, 2017. Accessed May 06, 2018. https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/epas-sue-settledirective-step-toward-transparency/.

7
complaint and the defendant is served. The defendant then responds back to the plaintiff
and sets a date for the trial. Pretrial discovery occurs before the trial date during which a
trial can be settled or dismissed.19 When settlement occurs, the trial is either dismissed or
judgement is entered in the court, usually through a consent decree. If settlement of the
case or dismissal does not occur, the trial then proceeds, and judgement is entered into by
the court. Following judgement, either the plaintiff or defendant may appeal to a higher
court for judgement reversal. Figure 3 shows this process.
In the absence of misconduct or collusion,20 parties involved in suits usually enter
into settlements when the result allows both parties to be better off than continuing
through the court process. Each party gains because the settlement removes the expense
of further litigation and the costs of time. Additionally, certain settlement costs can be tax
deductible, insuring that plaintiffs first look to settle before continuing litigation.21 Courts
ensure that the settlement is a reasonable result of good faith bargaining and consistent
with statutory requirements, i.e. not outside the agency’s purview.22 Settlements are a

19

A case can be dismissed either voluntarily or involuntarily. Voluntary dismissal occurs if the plaintiff
wishes to no longer pursue civil action or so that the case can be moved from small claims to another case.
Involuntarily dismissal occurs due to a lack of evidence, jurisdictional issues, and a variety of other
instances such as missed deadlines or paperwork issues. There are numerous reason why a judge will
dismiss a case before trail but usually occurs after a motion to dismiss is filed by either party. A court may
dismiss a case with prejudice, which means that no suit can be brought back to court on this issue by the
plaintiff, or without prejudice, which allows for the case to be brought back to the court after issues with
the case are fixed. See Harris, Berger, LLP, and Samuel D. Brickley, II. "Businesslawbasics.com." Ch. 19:
Uniform Commercial Code. 2013. Accessed September 29, 2018.
http://www.businesslawbasics.com/chapter-9-steps-civil-case.
20
The implications of collusion is discussed in the Question of Collusion section of this paper.
21
Li, Yan-Xin. "Tax Consequences of Litigation Damages and Settlements." Association of Corporate
Counsel. Accessed October 06, 2018. https://www.acc.com/legalresources/quickcounsel/litigationdamages-and-settlements.cfm#hid5.
22
Percival, Robert V. "The Bounds of Consent: Consent Decrees, Settlements and Federal Environmental
Policy Making." University of Chicago Legal Forum 1987, no. 1, pg. 347. Accessed September 28, 2018.
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol1987/iss1/13.

8
result of private negotiation and therefore cannot be appealed, which allows for finality in
the terms reached by both parties.

Figure 3: Civil Court Case
Proceedings

Additionally, parties may enter into settlements to change the behavior of the
agency (usually regarding mandatory duties) or to create unique regulatory relief that

9
would not have been available via the courts. For example, in Environmental Defense
Fund v. EPA, No. 86-1334 (D.C. Cir. 1986) the settlement stipulated that the EPA would
gather and consider information that was beyond the minimum required by law.23
Settlement allows for superior relief to litigants, relative to a court ruling, within the
limitations of the law.
As the defendant, the EPA may settle to prevent the court from creating policy or
regulation through judgement or by creating a precedent for future litigants. Additionally,
a judge may place harsher sentencing on the agency than a settlement would.24 By
settling, the agency can create a remedial plan of their preference and prevent any
decisions that place constraints on the agency’s discretionary choices. In 1985, a study
estimated that 80 percent of the EPA’s regulations were challenged in court with 30
percent of those regulations being drastically changed.25 Since then, the number of
agency settlements has increased rapidly.26 This leads to another reason the agency will
choose to settle: resource constraints. Time spent in court proceedings could be used
instead to prevent regulatory implementation delays,27 and settlements conserve litigation
resources.

23

Percival, Robert V. "The Bounds of Consent: Consent Decrees, Settlements and Federal Environmental
Policy Making." University of Chicago Legal Forum 1987, no. 1, pg. 331-332 footnote 16. Accessed
September 28, 2018. http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol1987/iss1/13.
24
Ibid, pg. 332.
25
Lawrence Susskind & Gerard McMahon, “The Theory and Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking,” Yale J.
on Reg. 1985, vol.134.
26
From 2009-2017 there were a total of 940 settlements that the EPA participated in; approximately 200 of
which the EPA was a defendant. See Freedom of Information Act Request. "Settlements Between
1/20/2009 and 1/19/2017 Involving the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act or Endangered Species Act."
Department of Justice Environment and Natural Resources Division. August 08, 2017. Accessed September
29, 2018. https://cfpub.epa.gov/compliance/cases/index.cfm?sortby=DESCRIPTION.
27
Most suits brought against the EPA are either pursuing judicial review of the agency’s regulations or
suits that allege the agency has failed to meet mandatory deadlines.

10
Enforcement of settlements is another reason to settle rather than proceed to
judgement. Settlements are enforced through the fear that litigation will be revived if the
contract is reneged on.28 Contract law applies to settlements and courts can directly
enforce settlements by labeling a party in breach of contract. Additionally, the use of
consent decrees allows for easy enforcement and revision of settlements. Consent decrees
are contracts that have attributes of a judicial order: consent decrees are enforceable by
contempt of court.29 Additionally, they can be altered over the objections of a party,
through the court, if necessary.30 However, consent decrees cannot dictate legal
obligations on third parties who did not join the settlement.31
Consent decrees allow agencies to change policy in the future and are more easily
modified than judgements;32 this allows future administrations to not be bound to policies
enacted by past administrations. Settlements used in conjunction with consent decrees
enable the plaintiff to enforce change without forcing the agency to admit to liability.
Agencies also use consent decrees as “protracted informal rule-making.”33 Thus, use of
consent decrees has increased analogous to the increased use of settlements.

28

Percival, Robert V. "The Bounds of Consent: Consent Decrees, Settlements and Federal Environmental
Policy Making." University of Chicago Legal Forum 1987, no. 1, pg.336. Accessed September 28, 2018.
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol1987/iss1/13.
29
Local Number 93 v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063, 3076 (1986).
30
Ibid.
31
Percival, Robert V. "The Bounds of Consent: Consent Decrees, Settlements and Federal Environmental
Policy Making." University of Chicago Legal Forum 1987, no. 1, pg. 348. Accessed September 28, 2018.
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol1987/iss1/13.
32
Consent decrees allow litigants to easily resolve any interpretation and changes of circumstances issues.
See Percival, Robert V. "The Bounds of Consent: Consent Decrees, Settlements and Federal Environmental
Policy Making." University of Chicago Legal Forum 1987, no. 1, pg. 335-336. Accessed September 28,
2018. http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol1987/iss1/13.
33
Ibid, pg.336.
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However, settlements do create some loss to society. Trials are public records and
thus, easily available to all interested parties whether part of negotiations or not.
Settlements are private contracts and the terms of the settlements are not required to be
public,34 though the Freedom of Information Act allows for those records to become
public through submission of an information claim. Settlements may also reflect the
resources available to each party rather than the claims that each party makes.35 Also, the
conservation of litigation resources may cause more lawsuits as groups previously limited
find they have additional resources to work with.36 Settlements can also affect third
parties negatively. As settlements can result in drastic regulation change, industries
affected by EPA regulation are forced to redirect firm resources towards monitoring
litigation that could potentially harm them.37 A more detailed analysis of the full effect of
settlements on society is discussed in a later section.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The debate surrounding the sue-and-settle policy is nothing new. To answer the
question of whether duplicity occurs in the settlements, in 2014, the Government

34

Most agency settlements that produce a change in regulation result in a press release about the regulation
change.
35
Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073 (1984). The Equal Access to Justice Act allows the
government to pay those who sue it, preventing litigation precedent based off of the wealthy. The Equal
Access to Justice Act is discussed in more detail in Revolving Payment section.
36
Percival, Robert V. "The Bounds of Consent: Consent Decrees, Settlements and Federal Environmental
Policy Making." University of Chicago Legal Forum 1987, no. 1, pg. 333 footnote 26. Accessed September
28, 2018. http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol1987/iss1/13.
37
Ibid, pg. 349. See also Judge Wilkey Dissenting Opinion, Citizens for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch,
718 F.2d 1136, D.C. Circuit (1983).

12
Accountability Office (GAO) released a report that deadline suits (the type of sue-andsettle cases that most recently came under review) had little policy impact on the EPA.38
The report did not study other types of settlements, such as decision-forcing consent
decrees since the public can comment on such decrees,39 considering them negligible to
the conversation of collusion. However, lawyer Ben Tyson argues that though decisionforcing suits conserve resources, they can undermine Congress and public participation in
the regulatory process.40 The Director of Environmental Law at the University of
Maryland, Dr. Robert Percival, argues that settlements are a necessary part of the
regulatory process and that binding consent decrees enforce those settlements. Thus,
according to Percival, settlements that create decision-forcing consent decrees are healthy
for both the judiciary and agency.41
A different report released by the GAO states that the policy of sue-and-settle
adds a financial burden to the EPA through attorney fees forced upon the agency by the
Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA).42 The report showed that there was no discernible
trend in the financial data, although environmental protection groups were more likely to

38

This is opposite to what the US Chamber of Commerce reports decided. See footnote 41. "Environmental
Litigation: Impact of Deadline Suits on EPA's Rulemaking Is Limited." U.S. Government Accountability
Office (U.S. GAO). January 14, 2015. Accessed May 06, 2018. https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-34.
39
Many consider the public comment period as too short or as not received by the EPA, see footnote 17s.
40
Tyson, Ben. "An Empirical Analysis of Sue-and-Settle in Environmental Litigation." Virginia Law
Review, November 2014. Accessed May 06, 2018.
http://www.virginialawreview.org/volumes/content/empirical-analysis-sue-and-settle-environmentallitigation.
41
Percival, Robert V. "The Bounds of Consent: Consent Decrees, Settlements and Federal Environmental
Policy Making." University of Chicago Legal Forum, 1987, no. 1, pg. 347. Accessed September 28, 2018.
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol1987/iss1/13.
42
The financial burden placed on the EPA is simply a result of resources spent dealing with litigation. The
impact of the financial burden placed on the EPA is discussed in later sections. "Environmental Litigation:
Cases against EPA and Associated Costs over Time." U.S. Government Accountability (U.S. GAO),
August 31, 2011. Accessed September 29, 2018. https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-650.

13
receive funds through litigation than other litigants. In two different studies by the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, they found the regulatory burden caused by sue-and-settle cases
to be significant, amounting to around $488 billion of costs.43
Alternatively, Stephen Johnson, professor of law, explains that though settlements
are costly, litigation would be a far worse alternative as it would increase societal costs.44
Another paper by Courtney McVean and Justin Pidot, professors of law, details how the
citizen suit is a beneficial policy for agencies and that Congress intended citizen suits to
act as a check on agency behavior by ensuring deadlines are met. They argue that the
process of sue-and-settle allows bureaucracies to overcome habitual procedures and
mitigate the risk of litigation.45
However, lawyers Janette Ferguson and Laura Granier argue that there are
inherent problems in the sue and settle process, or at least unintended consequences.46
Henry Butler and Nathaniel Harris, professors of law, argue that one of the unintended
consequences of using sue-and-settle for rulemaking is that the states are left with less

43

Kovacs, William L., Keith W. Holman, and Jonathan A. Jackson. "Sue and Settle: Regulating Behind
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44
Johnson, Stephen M., “Sue and Settle: Demonizing the Environmental Citizen Suit.” Seattle University
Law Review, 2014, vol. 37, no. 891, 2014. Accessed October 3, 2018. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2478866.
45
McVean, Courtney and Pidot, Justin R., “Environmental Settlements and Administrative Law.” Harvard
Environmental Law Review 2015; U Denver Legal Studies Research Paper no. 14-25. Accessed September
30, 2018. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2425990.
46
Ferguson, Janette L., and Laura K. Granier. "Sue and Settle: Citizen Suit Settlements and Environmental
Law." Natural Resources and Environment, 2015, vol.30, no. 1.
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environmental enforcement and regulatory capabilities.47 Lawyer Travis A. Voyles
discusses the impacts that the sue-and-settle process has had on society and how to work
within the current system for better transparency.48
Joanna Schwartz, a professor of law, uses information collected on police
brutality court cases to argue that government lawsuit settlements create a financial
burden that is paid out by taxpayers without incentivizing behavioral changes from the
police department; the same logic of incentives can be applied to federal agencies.49 Two
other papers discuss the effect that settlements have on the judicial system.50 Additional
papers debate the effect of settlements on the creation of common law.51
This paper will further expound upon the ideas discussed by Voyles, Butler and
Harris, Ferguson and Granier, and others by considering the unintended consequences of
the sue-and-settle policy, such as issues about the impact of settlements on common law
and the judicial system. The impact that the sue-and-settle policy has on Congress, the

47

Butler, Henry N., and Nathaniel J. Harris. "Sue, Settle, and Shut Out the States: Destroying the
Environmental Benefits of Cooperative Federalism." Harvard Journal Of Law and Policy, October 21,
2013, vol. 37, no. 2. Accessed October 3, 2018. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2343273.
48
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https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/jluenvl31&div=16&id=&page=.
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Environmental Protection Agency and its regulation, and the judiciary and the law is
discussed in further detail later in this paper.

THE QUESTION OF COLLUSION

Bureaucracies receive large leeway on how to enact laws. Congress writes laws in
abstract terms and then allows government agencies to enact policies that enforce the law.
The only check on bureaucratic actions are Congressional oversight committees, the
budget, and citizens who sue regulators. Congressional oversight committees are
restricted from effective oversight because of the asymmetric information that passes
from the agency to the committee. Similarly, bureaucracies enforce policies in such a
way so that their budget is maximized, and their jobs are secure.52 One of the most
effective checks on bureaucratic behavior is targeted prosecution initiated against the
agencies for their regulations.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines collusive action as “an action between two parties
who have no actual controversy, being merely for the purpose of determining a legal
question or receiving a precedent that might prove favorable in related litigation.”53 For
the rest of this paper, collusion and collusive action will be used interchangeably.

52

Niskanen, William A. "The Peculiar Economics of Bureaucracy." The American Economic Review 1968,
vol.58, no. 2. Accessed September 30, 2018, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1831817.
53
Black, Henry Campbell, Joseph R. Nolan, and Michael J. Connolly. Black Law Dictionary: Definitions of
the Terms and Phrases of American and English Jurisprudence, Ancient and Modern 1979, 2nd ed, pg.12.
St. Paul, MN: West Publ.
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Additionally, this paper will not question whether collusive action should be illegal or if
it is ethical, merely the impact that such actions can have on the outcome of cases and the
overall legal system.
Collusive action is an important part of the sue-and-settle process. If the plaintiff
and the defendant are not actually at odds with each other, then the court case is
misleading, and litigated for the sole purpose of creating public policy without going
through the proper channels. To create regulation, the EPA normally must first propose a
regulation through a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) which is then added to the
Federal Register for public comments. After a designated period of time, the EPA
reviews the comments and makes necessary changes to the proposed regulation. The
regulation is then codified in the Code of Federal Regulations.54 By using the courts and
skipping this process, the EPA and the plaintiffs of the cases can bypass public opinion.
This often results in the enactment of regulations with large impacts where those
impacted had little or no say in the matter.55
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"The Basics of the Regulatory Process." EPA. September 25, 2018. Accessed September 30, 2018.
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See comments in Why Sue and Settle? section above. This paper does not comment on whether public
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SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS AND CRONYISM

According to the theory of public choice,56 bureaucrats can be “captured” by
special interest groups.57 Special interest groups are a collection of people who seek
advantages usually through government action. Environmental groups are classified as
special interest groups who are seeking environmental policy changes through
government intervention. Bureaucrats may enter government because they have some
particular objective they wish to achieve. One way that special interest groups capture
bureaucrats is by lobbying Congress to allocate funds for specific purposes.58 This creates
a relationship between the special interest groups and the bureaucrat which often leads to
a form of cronyism.
Cronyism refers to individuals or groups who are given jobs or other types of
advantages, such as regulatory advantages, regardless of the individual or group
qualifications or reasoning. Cronyism is a form of collusion, where private individuals
use a political process to pursue a private advantage. In the United States, both sides of
the political spectrum suffer from cronyism.59

56

Public choice is a theory of why government can fail, similar to the economic theory of market failure. In
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Not only do elected officials appoint those who have questionable qualifications
for a position, but they also participate in cronyism through direct economic bailouts.60
For example, in 2008, the Bush administration bailed out the insurance company
American International Group for $182 billion.61 This bailout was engineered principally
by Henry Paulson, the Treasury Secretary, who previously had worked for Goldman
Sachs. The main beneficiary from the bailout funds paid to AIG was Goldman Sachs,
who received $12.9 billion.62 Although Paulson did not directly gain from the bailout, his
former friends and colleagues did.63
Another example of American cronyism is the Solyndra subsidy awarded by the
Obama administration in 2009. Steve Spinner was a senior advisor in the Energy
Department and his wife was a lawyer that represented Solyndra in its bid for a subsidy.
E-mails between various officials show that Spinner actively worked to get the Solyndra
bid approved.64 The end result: a $535 million65 investment into Solyndra lost when the
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company went bankrupt by 2011.66 Bailouts and loan guarantees are one major way that
the government engages in cronyism, but the government can also create preferential
treatment through land seizure, regulations and laws, political appointees, government
contracts, monopolies, and taxation.67
In environmental policy, cronyism is often more indirect. Bureaucrats in charge of
creating regulation become experts in that field and, upon leaving government office, will
be hired by the groups who solicit or lobby for specific environmental regulation.68 In
turn, bureaucrats will often use those experts to create regulation. Thus, it is difficult to
measure how much of the relationship is due to expertise and how much is due to quidpro-quo regulation creation and job hiring. The interrelationship of the environmental
advocates and the regulators is why the policy of sue-and-settle has become an issue.
Thus, cronyism is a form of collusion: the regulator and environmental activist gain the
ability to skip the long policy implementation process.69
However, it is difficult to verify that collusion does occur in the court setting. If
collusion is happening, it is through private individuals using the legal process to pursue
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a private advantage. One way to measure collusion is the time between when the suit was
filed and when the settlement was agreed upon. Often consent decrees are filed at the
same time as the complaint, leaving virtually no room for negotiations with interested
third parties.70 This time frame alludes to collusion, otherwise settlement would likely not
occur until years later. In the following sections, a regression analysis of the time frame
to settlement and the plaintiffs involved is evaluated. An arbitrary term of 6 months or
less is used to consider a possible domain of collusive action, as without a direct
confirmation that collusion occurred, it is impossible to declare a suitable time frame that
would only include collusive court cases. Thus, the following analysis can only show if
plaintiffs influence the time to settlement, whether that is because of the law firms used,
the issues brought to court, or collusion between the parties it is difficult to determine.

DATA DESCRIPTION

The data used in this section comes from a Freedom of Information Act request
from the EPA. The EPA provided a list of all suits filed against the agency from 20002010. The suits filed were then searched in a law database to establish whether the case
was settled, or a verdict issued. A total of 848 separate suits were filed against the EPA
during the decade (although the number could be larger as some cases were
consolidated). After removing the cases held in abeyance, the sample number of
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observations used in this paper is 670. Of that 670, 480 suits reached a verdict and 190
were settled. There were 365 different plaintiffs who filed suit in 62 different courts. The
maximum time it took for a case to be settled was just over 22 years and the minimum
was within one month.
This section focuses on the different plaintiffs who filed at least 10 suits and the
courts that adjudicated at least 50 suits. Table 1 shows the number of consent decrees,
verdicts issued, and total number of cases by different plaintiffs. The courts used in

Table 1: List of Plaintiffs by Courts and Case Results (2000-2010)
Consent Consent Total*

Plaintiff
Sierra Club
WildEarth
Guardians
Natural Resource
Defense Council
American Lung
Association

Verdict Verdict Total*

Decree

Decree

Consent Issued

Issued

Verdict

(DCC)

(DDC)

(DCC)

(DDC)

15

9

37

19

2

35

72

8

0

10

3

0

3

13

4

2

10

17

0

19

29

1

0

8

6

0

6

14

5

2

8

1

0

5

13

1

2

6

5

1

7

13

Total

American
Chemistry
Council
Environmental
Defense Inc.

*The Total Verdict and Total Consent columns include the settlements and verdicts
from other courts in addition to the DCC and DDC courts.
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Table 1 and the sample data are the District of Columbia Court (DDC) and the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals (DCC).71
Cases settled in under 6 months are considered as potential periods of collusive
action and cases with verdicts issued in less than 6 months were often dismissed for lack
of evidence or jurisdiction. A total of 119 cases were finalized in less-than six-months, 50
were dismissed and 69 were settled. In total the data set contains 190 settlements; thus,
the probability that if a case was settled it was within six months is 36.3%.

ANALYSIS OF RELATIONSHIP

Do the courts used and the plaintiffs suing have a significant effect on the amount
of time it takes to settle a case? If collusion occurs, that is a possibility. As discussed
earlier, while this paper cannot clearly define collusion enough to show causation, a
significant difference in the time spent settling a case through an adversarial channel, and
the time spent settling a case with some sort of complicity between the two parties would
logically be different. This paper tests the idea that some type of collusion occurs when
the settlement is reached in under six months. Thus, a binary choice model was chosen to
explore the question of statistical correlation between the parties or courts involved in the
suits. The binary model controls for whether a settlement occurs in less-than six months
rather than a settlement or judgement entered at a later date. This paper, additionally,

71

The two courts DCC and DDC had the vast majority of EPA cases litigated in them. The sample data,
thus, only includes those plaintiffs who have ten or more suits filed against the EPA in either the DCC
court of the DDC court.
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models the data in a linear probability model (LPM), a probit model, and a logit model to
further examine the empirical relationships.
The initial equation used to estimate the parameters was as follows:
̂
̂ + 𝛽2 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡
̂
𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒 (6
𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑓

[1]

The parameter court controls for the different courts in which the case is litigated in and
the parameter plaintiff controls for the different plaintiffs. Settle (6 months) refers to the
binary choice that the case is settled within six months or less or if it is not. Equation 1
estimates whether the time for a court case to reach a settlement in 6 months is
statistically significant when the effects of the plaintiff and courts are controlled for.
Table 2 (pg. 24) shows the results of the different models of equation 1. The table
depicts the coefficients and standard errors for the plaintiffs and courts for each different
model. LPM[1] stands for the linear probability model for equation 1, with the probit and
logit models similarly labeled.
The results found in table 2 from equation 1 illustrate that few plaintiffs have a
statistically significant impact on the time to settlement being within 6 months. The only
plaintiff with more than two cases with a statistically significant level below 1% was the
Rocky Mountain Clean Air Action group, who only filed four cases against the EPA in
10 years. The Sierra Club is also statistically significant but only at the 5% level. This
shows that a relationship does exist between the Sierra Club and the settlement being
within 6 months. However, this only shows correlation and it cannot be stated that the
relationship is a collusive one. The court used had the largest impact on whether a case
was settled in less than six months. As table 2 shows, both the DCC and DDC courts
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Table 2: Model Coefficients and Standard Errors of Equation 1
LPM[1]

Probit[1]

Logit[1]

Intercept

0.9864***

2.063

3.462

Standard Error

0.1128572

5,780

4,1340

American Chemistry Council

-0.019714

-0.4623

-0.2210

0.063248

4,215

3,0220

0.013645

4.021

18.10

0.092964

4,087

2,9230

0.18874

4.969

19.74

0.12491

4,087

2,9230

0.060526

4.129

17.85

0.060859

4,087

2,9230

0.14053*

4.877

19.48

0.05440

4,087

2,9230

0.34176

5.628

20.83

0.18477

4,087

2,9230

0.96668***

12.09

42.80

0.079708

4,674

3,3560

-0.98635***

-8.146

-25.03

0.12091

4,087

2,9230

-0.88640***

-7.376

-23.64

0.14214

4,087

2,9230

American Lung Association

Environmental Defense Inc.

Natural Resources Defense

Sierra Club

WildEarth Guardians

Rocky Mountain Clean Air

DCC

DDC

Statistical Significance codes: p-value <.001***; <.01**; <.05*
LPM: Residual stand. error: 0.2924 on 309 DF73; Multiple R-squared: 0.5306;
Adjusted R-squared: -0.01631; F-statistic: 0.9702; p-value: 0.6098
Probit: Null deviance: 413.21 on 669 DF; Residual deviance: 148.51 on 309 DF;
Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 19
Logit:Null deviance: 413.21 on 669 DF; Residual deviance: 148.37 on 309 DF;
Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 20
72
73

Robust standard errors were used for the LPM models to reduce heteroskedasticity errors.
DF stands for degrees of freedom.
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were statistically significant below the 1% level. Eleven other courts also had a statistical
significance at the 1% level; the model coefficients and standard errors of those courts
can be found in table A-4 in Appendix A.
While plaintiffs did not have a statistical correlation with settlements in under six
months, another analysis show that there is some relationship between a plaintiff and if a
settlement occurs. This secondary equation controls for the effects of the plaintiffs and
courts on settlement occurrence:
̂
̂ + 𝛽3 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡
̂ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
̂
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡
+ 𝛽2 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑓

[2]

The parameters court and plaintiff are defined as previously stated for equation 1. The
parameter difference refers to the difference in months for a settlement to be reached
from the time the suit was first filed. Consent is the binary choice of whether a settlement
happened or not. A third equation shows the effect of time to settlement without
controlling for the effects of the different plaintiffs and courts74:
̂
̂ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡

[3]

Table 3 (pg. 27) shows the results of the modelling of equation 2 by the different
models, table 4 (pg. 28) models the results for equation 3 without controls. Table 3 shows
the difference each of the models and equations have on the parameter coefficients. The
paper controls for all other plaintiffs, not just the ones shown, and courts but only shows
the courts and plaintiffs that have more than ten cases litigated.
To understand which model is the best model to use for this data set, the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) scores for each

74

Similarly, another equation modeled to control only for the courts and another equation that controlled
only for the plaintiffs were analyzed but are not detailed in this paper.
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model were considered. The AIC and BIC scores for the LPM models are the lowest, 75
making the LPM model the best model to use. This section focuses on the LPM model
coefficients and the statistical significance of those effects. 76
In the LPM [2] model the coefficient for the difference in years is -0.00068
whereas the LPM [3]’s coefficient is 0.000699. Controlling for plaintiffs and courts, the
time to settlement has a negative effect on if a case is settled but a positive when these
factors are not controlled for. This suggests that the plaintiffs involved, and the courts
used play a large role in whether a settlement occurs. The results of the LPM model
demonstrate that the various plaintiffs – the special interest groups – have a statistically
significant impact on whether a case is settled or not. Except for two plaintiffs, the table
plaintiff’s effect on the settlement is statistically significant at the 1% level. For example,
for every suit that the WildEarth Guardians brought against the EPA, the case was 71.3
percentage points more likely to be settled as compared to other plaintiffs’ briefs.
These results indicate that the court used for litigation has an equal or larger
impact than plaintiffs on whether a case is settled or not. As stated previously the
individual court has a large effect on the plaintiff’s settlement being within 6 months.
While the plaintiff and court have a statistical impact on the time of settlement, all this
shows is a correlation. The next section gives a more compelling reason for considering

75

See Appendix A for more information about the AIC and BIC scores of the individual models for each
equation.
76
A Breusch-Pagan test was run on the model and the p-value of 0.9454 suggests that there is
homoskedasticity in the residuals and they are not serially correlated. A normality test shows that the data
is not normally distributed. Finally, the Shapiro-Wilk normality test shows that with a p-value less than 1%
the data is not a normal distribution.
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Table 3: Model Coefficients and Standard Errors of Equation 2
LPM[2]

Probit[2]

Logit[2]

Intercept

0.872773***

1.3

2.257

Standard Error

0.112855

5,780

1.8277

Time to Settlement

-0.00068

-0.00139

-0.00365

0.0008212

0.004101

0.0974

0.68039***

6.83

21.95

0.063248

4,087

17,730

0.12723

4.784

18.31

0.092964

4,087

17,730

0.273266*

5.383

19.39

0.124911

4,087

17,730

0.266326***

5.38

19.4

0.060859

4,087

17,730

0.41156***

5.828

20.15

0.054400

4,087

17,730

0.713265***

6.725

21.56

0.184759

4,087

17,730

-0.84212***

-7.321

-22.66

0.120906

4,087

17,730

-0.5760***

-6.377

-21.14

0.142137

4,087

17,730

American Chemistry Council

American Lung Association

Environmental Defense Inc.

Natural Resources Defense

Sierra Club

Wild-Earth Guardians

DCC

DDC

Statistical Significance codes: p-value <.001***; <.01**; <.05*
LPM: Residual standard error: 0.381 on 308 DF; Multiple R-squared: 0.6715;
Adjusted R-squared: 0.2865; F-statistic: 1.744; p-value: 2.936e-07
Probit: Null deviance: 799.05 on 669 DF; Residual deviance: 240.03 on 308 DF;
Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 19
Logit: Null deviance: 799.05 on 669 DF; Residual deviance: 239.14 on 308 DF;
Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 19
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that this statistical correlation is due to possible collusion by showing the revolving
payments between the EPA and the plaintiffs.

Table 4: Model Coefficients and Standard Errors of Equation 3

Intercept

Time to Settlement

LPM[3]

Probit[3]

Logit[3]

0.28191***

-0.57647

-0.93494

0.11285

0.072412

0.003422

0.000699

0.001773

0.120662

0.007253

0.083

0.035452

Statistical Significance codes: p-value <.001***; <.01**; <.05*
LPM: Residual standard error: 0.4514 on 668 DF; Multiple R-squared: 1.39e-05;
Adjusted R-squared: -0.001483; F-statistic: 0.009289; p-value: 0.9232
Probit: Null deviance: 799.05 on 669 DF; Residual deviance: 799.04 on 668 DF;
Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4
Logit: Null deviance: 799.05 on 669 DF; Residual deviance: 799.04 on 668 DF;
Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

REVOLVING PAYMENTS

According to public choice economics, bureaucrats are self-interested individuals
acting on those interests in the public sphere.77 Their self-interest will cause bureaucrats
to seek to maximize their agency’s budget and regulatory power in order to achieve a
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goal, increase job security, and increase the agency’s political power and importance.78
Understanding the goal that a bureaucrat pursues helps to explain why the bureaucrat
seeks certain relationships while in office.
Special interest groups use lobbying firms to persuade Congress to appropriate
funds toward their causes. This allows agencies, such as the EPA, to receive larger
budgets and additional regulatory authority. In turn, the EPA pays the attorney fees of the
special interest groups who sue the EPA. The funds spent by the special interest group in
lobbying for more regulatory action is then given back to the group through litigation
fees.79 The argument of revolving payments is part of the idea that collusion occurs in
sue-and-settle cases.
In 2011, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report
stating that no discernible trends occur in EPA’s litigation payments.80 The Department
of Justice spent about $3.3 million to defend the EPA in court from 2003 to 2010.81
Taken from the GAO report, figure 482 shows that no year appeared to result in
dramatically more payments than other years, and overall costs remained about the same.
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While the GAO report shows there is no discernible trends in the EPA litigation
payments, it is interesting to note that specific groups received comparatively more
payments per case. From 2003 to 2010, the Department of Treasury paid out about $14.2
million for costs and attorney fees to the plaintiffs of litigation against the EPA. That
averages to about $1.8 million per fiscal year.86 Figure 587 shows the breakdown of the
various plaintiffs by year, while figure 688 shows the amount paid to plaintiffs each year.

Figure 5: Environmental Cases filed against EPA, Fiscal Year 1985-2010
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The national environmental groups in figure 6 are far larger proportionately than in figure
5 by year. In comparison, trade associations, the largest group in figure 5 for year 2010, is
similarly proportioned in each graph despite having the largest number of cases. There
are a variety of reasons why environmental groups would receive the largest amount of

Figure 6: Treasury Judgement Fund Payments, Fiscal Year 2003-2010
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payments: the type of suits litigated or regulation indicted,89 the Equal Access to Justice
Act, or collusion.
The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) authorizes the government to pay for
attorney fees and costs to individuals, small businesses, and public interest groups that
prevail in litigation.90 A 1980 conference committee report demonstrated that such
individuals and organizations would not contend against government action because of
the costs associated and disparity in resources between them and the government.91
Overtime, the EPA began to pay attorney fees and costs in settlements as well; especially
in settlements where the plaintiff would most likely prevail in litigation.92
Figure 793 shows the amount paid by EPA under the Equal Access to Justice Act
(EAJA) for environmental cases each year from 2006 to 2010. This data seems to support
the argument that it is the EAJA causing the disproportionate payments shown in figures
5 and 6, as the vast majority of payments went to local and national environmental groups
for every year except 2010. This could be a result of how environmental groups are using
the advantage of the EAJA to ensure the cost of litigation against the EPA is minimized.
The payments do, however, show that there is some relationship between the two groups,
whether it is collusion or simply a result of citizen suits, it is difficult to determine. The
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impact of the relationship between the plaintiffs and defendants is discussed in the next
section.

Figure 7: Amount Paid by EPA under EAJA for Environmental Cases

THE IMPACT OF SUE-AND-SETTLE ON SOCIETY

Civic participation is a substantial feature of environmental policy. As discussed
in previous sections, the Clean Air Act of 1970 encourages civil litigation to help enforce
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environmental policy.94 Congress hoped that by encouraging citizen suits, the few
resources allocated to environmental protection could be shifted from monitoring
situations to implementing policy.95 To help induce civilian assistance, Congress created
the Equal Access to Justice Act to cover the costs of litigation.96 Additionally, public
notice and comment periods were added by the Administrative Procedures Act to
encourage the public’s participation in regulation creation.97 The original purpose of the
citizen suit was to encourage citizen initiative and reduce agency resources used to
monitor pollution.
However, unintended consequences have occurred because of the abundant use of
citizen suits. Issues have been introduced by scholars studying the impact of sue-andsettle on the states, such as “agency capture; the improper use of congressionally
appropriated funds; limited participation for affected parties and the public; and
avoidance of procedural requirements of the APA and other laws or executive orders
regarding rulemaking.”98 Additionally, though the EAJA was meant to encourage civic
litigation, the EPA has incurred extensive costs through settlement.99 Civic action has
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prompted agencies to overcome the bureaucratic inertia and speed up legislation and
executive action, which can be considered beneficial or detrimental.100
Third party issues are also caused by sue-and-settle.101 The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure allow for interested third parties to intervene in litigation, but the burden of
proof to show that their interests are not being considered in each case, rests with the
third party.102 Not only is intervention difficult, but third parties must also monitor cases
for possible intrusive litigation. Complaints and consent decrees are often filed at the
same time, making it challenging for third parties to intervene before the decrees are
approved, and even more difficult to object to the settlement once the decrees are
enacted.103 Notice and comment periods are often considered not long enough or the
comments not well-received, thus making it even more problematic for affected third
parties to voice their complaints.104
Settlements, though, save both parties litigation costs which conserves resources
for the agency and the judicial system.105 Settlements have allowed agencies to authorize
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protracted rulemaking, simplifying regulation and Congressional policies.106 Protracted
rulemaking is ambiguously viewed; it can be considered both a positive and negative
burden on society.107 Additionally, settlements must not “violate applicable laws”;108 so
that all agency decisions must fall within the directives from Congress. Throughout this
section, these issues and others caused by sue-and-settle will be discussed, including how
the actions of Congress, the EPA, and the judiciary can be considered under the belief
that collusion occurs.

EFFECT ON THE REGULATORY PROCESS

Many critics blame the problems caused by sue-and-settle on Congress and its
lack of legislation expressly defining the terms of citizen suits.109 Congress attempted to
authorize citizen suits while preserving the authority of government regulators, but the
legislation failed to fill statutory gaps, allowing judges to exercise discretion in ordering
judgement of suits.110 Decisions, such as Hallstrom v Tillamook, created a framework
that enables defendants of civic litigation to prevent such suits.111 Additionally, by
leaving loopholes in environmental legislation, Congress has permitted the EPA to enter
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into settlement agreements that expand the agency’s regulatory authority beyond the
environmental acts and use settlements as a new source of authority for further
regulation.112
Others argue that Congress made “particular efforts to draft a provision that would
not reduce the effectiveness of administrative enforcement” or “cause abuse of the
courts.”113 The inclusion of the notice and diligent prosecution provisions within the
citizen suit section of the environmental acts show that Congress did not want
unconstrained citizen access to the courts.114
While the governance of citizen suits falls under congressional authorizing
committees, and not the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, critics claim that the
committees have limited expertise dealing with legal issues and cannot prevent the abuse
of citizen suits.115 Additionally, the Office of Management and Budget, which should be
involved in suits that create a regulatory impact, is rarely asked to produce impact reports
for settlements.116 Thus, some consider Congress at fault for the problems caused by sueand-settle by failing to create detailed legislation and meaningful oversight of citizen
suits and agency actions.
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ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
The EPA similarly receives an unflattering reputation regarding sue-and-settle
suits. Unreasonable deadlines set in settlements often lead to “rushed [and] sloppy
rulemaking.”117 The ineffective regulation and quick deadlines then prevent the agency
from complying with Congressional requirements for a thorough review of regulation.118
Before regulation is created, a dialogue is typically sought with the affected industry.
When settlements do not have representation for the regulated community privy to the
negotiations, the agency ends up creating regulation that is ill-advised and difficult for
target industries to comply with.119 Though the agency is not legally obligated to enact
certain types of regulations, settlement agreements predispose the agency to do so to
avoid litigation.120 Additionally, extremely detailed settlements impose increasingly exact
obligations on the agency,121 forcing the agency to divert resources and prioritize
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different programs.122 This backdoor rulemaking is, arguably, the point of citizen suits: to
streamline future regulations by demonstrating a process of rule-making that society finds
more desirable.
Despite the numerous issues settlements can cause, they do allow the agency to seek
solutions that would not otherwise be considered as it would not be within the court’s
jurisdiction to offer such solutions.123 As stated previously, settlements reduce the
agency’s litigation cost which can open up resources for other programs. Some argue that
settlements prevent judgements that could affect an agency’s, and thus the executive’s,
discretionary power.124 Additionally, most settlements are outside of the Administrative
Procedures Act meaning that no public notice and comment period is required by law.125
However, against the backdrop of collusion occurring in the settlement process, the
EPA’s actions are perceived as deliberately infringing on executive discretion.126 By
ignoring rules such as review by the public, the regulated community, and the executive
branch; the EPA fails to represent the executive branch.127 Instead, the EPA is seen as
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pursuing its own agenda without regard to federal procedures.128 Without the framework
of collusion, the agency’s actions take on a less negative connotation. Instead, the EPA is
seen as strategically pursuing its own agenda.129 As previously stated, public choice
economics depicts bureaucrats as individuals, working in the public sphere, who seek to
maximize their own self-interest. Thus, an agency will attempt to increase both its
influence and budget.130
The EPA pursues settlements that help expand its political power; enabling the
agency to lobby for a larger budget to encompass its additional jurisdiction. Some critics
of sue-and-settle worry that settlements could be used to bind a future administration’s
policy initiatives.131 Under the scope of collusion, when an agency does try to create a
binding regulation for a future administration, the agency’s actions are subversive to the
regulatory process. When the agency’s actions are instead viewed under the lens of public
choice economics, the EPA is not undermining the government but is instead acting
rationally. Regulations can easily be repealed, so those currently in power will want to
entrench their preferred policies as strongly as possible.132 Additionally, some argue that
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the courts do not allow such substantive settlements.133 The next section describes in
more detail how the courts limit or enable citizen settlements by analyzing a case study.

Case Study: Fowler, et. al vs EPA, No.09-cv-00005,
On January 5, 2009, environmental protection groups sued the EPA for its failure
to protect the Chesapeake Bay from pollution.134 By May 10, 2010, the EPA reached a
settlement establishing total maximum daily load (TMDL) standards for nitrogen,
phosphorous, and sediment.135 The settlement also instructed the EPA to set new
stormwater regulations by 2012.136
In American Farm Bureau Federation vs EPA, plaintiffs claimed that the
settlement agreement circumvented procedures set in the Clean Water Act (CWA) for
state regulated water control and failed to provide scientific evidence that TMDL
standards were correctly specified.137 The plaintiffs also felt that a timeline of seven
months was too short for the public notice and comment period.138 The Middle District
Court of Pennsylvania and the Third Circuit, the original court and the appellant court,
both ruled in favor of the EPA and affirmed the settlement.139 On February 3, 2016, the
Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs appeal.140
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Though the Third Circuit court ruled that the EPA’s final action was not outside
of the scope of the CWA, issues remain from this sue-and-settle case. Specifically, critics
claim that the EPA has used the settlement as its source of regulatory authority rather
than the CWA to create and implement new stormwater programs.141 While the agency
might have the regulatory authority under the CWA, the EPA is instead using a
settlement agreement to enlarge its jurisdiction.142 Thus, within the context of potential
collusion, the EPA is perceived as expanding its own authority at the expense of the
executive by hastily creating ineffective regulation.

EFFECT ON THE JUDICIARY

The American court system is based on an adversarial system.143 This means, that,
for the truth to be established there must be some form of controversy between the two
parties in litigation. In an adversarial system, the two parties bring their potentially biased
versions of the truth into the court where they are compared. The suit is litigated by each
party working to promote its version of the claim.144 A court then judges which of the
versions is the most compelling. In an inquisitorial system, the judge, or usually a board
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of judges, carry out an independent investigation into the matter. The evidence is then
collected and judged by the judges.145
The United States uses an adversarial system because it is believed to prevent
inherent judicial bias.146 Additionally, adversarial systems are shown to unveil further
details in a court case than in an inquisitorial system.147 However, when like-minded
people sue each other, the adversarial system does not work as it should. The like-minded
individuals can establish the veracity of their claims without opposition.148 Often, the
cases of these individuals are settled before a judgement can be entered on the truth of the
claims.149 Under traditional common law jurisprudence, a judge does not create law but
defends it and establishes the boundaries of the law.150 Settlements remove the role of the
judiciary by preventing judges from carrying out their prescribed role.151 Thus,
settlements weaken the ability of judges to enforce or establish the law.
Settlement also prevents the development of the common law. By not allowing
for judgement, settlements do not create precedent.152 This permits greater leeway in
judicial opinions within cases that resort to litigation. Common law acts as a check on the
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executive authority; with less precedent to check an agency’s discretion, courts will
refrain from judgement to prevent the transfer of rulemaking to the judiciary. 153
Additionally, settlements create a loss of skilled adjudicators. Lawyers have become
moderators in a process of settlement rather than skilled adversarial counselors.154 As the
United States court system is based on adversary proceedings this can limit the creation
of future common law.
Settlements can also cause issues with public disclosure laws. Under the Freedom
of Information Act, information exchanged during settlements are subject to all FOIA
requests.155 However, a settlement agreement can include a court order preventing
disclosure of such documents.156 The incentives of the EPA and the special interest
groups converge on this matter: both groups want as much secrecy as possible to limit
criticism of new regulations that result from a settlement. Additionally, settlement
agreements do not have to be published, although they are still subject to all information
requests.157
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Intervention into settlements is also an issue for courts. There are three ways of
interceding into a settlement: intervention during the settlement; a lawsuit disputing the
legitimacy of the settlement; and asking for judicial review of the agency’s final action.158
The difficulty of preventing settlement agreements or even interceding during
negotiations is a concern for both industry and activist groups.159 Courts, as stated earlier,
are likely to prevent interested third parties unless they can prove substantial future
consequences due to the settlement decrees.160 It is difficult to prevent consent decrees
and costly to oppose them once they are implemented. In a study of the consent decrees
imposed by sue-and-settle suits, not one of the 88 cases identified as sue-and-settle were
prevented from introducing a consent decree by judicial review.161 Thus, some critics of
the sue-and-settle policy blame the judiciary for not acting as a better check.
Despite the numerous problems caused by settlements, they are still considered
beneficial to the court system.162 Settlements free up resources to allow for more pressing
cases to proceed through litigation. They remove frivolous cases from burdening society
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and allow class action suits to be settled in bulk.163 They allow for unique solutions that
otherwise would not occur in the system and speed up executive decisions. Interestingly,
activist groups who use sue-and-settle are more likely to incorporate a public notice and
comment period in the settlements than industry plaintiffs (at least during the Obama
administration).164 Settlements are also less costly than litigation, both personally and for
the state.165 Settlements would not occur within society if there were not benefits to both
parties that outweigh the costs.

Case Study: In Re ESA Section 4 Deadline Litigation, No.10-00377, DDC
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) requires the agency to issue an initial finding
on a species protection petition within 90 days of receiving the petition.166 Additionally,
the agency has one year to find whether the petition for species protection is “warranted,
not warranted, or warranted but precluded by higher-priority actions.”167 As a result of
the large amount of petitions filed, the agency often fails to review the petition within the
required timeframe; by 2010, there were more than 250 species protection petitions that
had been filed but not answered. This resulted in twelve lawsuits from the WildEarth
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Guardians and one from the Center for Biological Diversity which were then
consolidated into one litigation suit.168
The agency settled with the plaintiffs and agreed to a series of deadlines forcing
the agency to render a decision on all petitions, currently not resolved, by September of
2016.169 The agency also agreed to not use the warranted but precluded by higher
priorities for any of the petitions filed.170 In return, the environmental groups offered to
limit the number of petitions they filed and cease deadline litigation against the agency
for a time.171 The Safari Club International tried to intervene in the settlement but was
denied by the district court. On September 9, 2011, the ruling was then affirmed by the
D.C. Circuit and the settlement approved by the district court.172
There are a few problems with this settlement. First, agency inaction caused this
suit. Without the agency failing to respond, or without the unrealistic deadlines set in the
legislation, the suit would not have happened. Therefore, the question is whether the
agency or Congress was at fault for the regulatory failure. Second, the agency enacted a
substantive decision in removing the power to assign a species to the warranted but
precluded by higher actions status.173 The settlement agreement, thus, takes power that
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Congress gave to the agency and removes it. The agency limited future administrations
from exercising certain executive authority that Congress had granted.174 Interestingly,
supporters of sue-and-settle argue that courts would not allow for substantive decisions to
stand,175 yet, in the case of the ESA deadline litigation, a substantive agreement was
affirmed by two courts.
This introduces the final issue with sue-and-settle as shown by the ESA deadline
litigation case. Courts are likely to refrain from judgement for fear of transferring
rulemaking to the courts.176 Likewise, courts will hold intervenors to higher standards of
proof, lest the courts remove agency discretion.177 When viewed under the guise that
collusion transpires in these settlements, the lack of a check makes the courts appear
incompetent at enforcement.

THE LAW
The murky legislation surrounding the citizen suit provisions have left judges to
attempt to define statutes through opinions; a common occurrence in common law. The
opinions have created a variety of contradictory judgements that allow a judge to access
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an array of precedents to use to support their opinion.178 The court makes a calculated
decision to either refrain from ruling, and compel parties to settle, or to award relief to
one of the parties.179 Courts generally abstain from making judgements on regulatory
procedures and agency resources.180 Most courts enter judgement only when the agency
makes a substantive decision,181 although not always. The rest of this section will discuss
the effects two specific laws have had on the sue-and-settle policy: the Administrative
Procedures Act and the Equal Access to Justice Act.

The Administrative Procedures Act
The APA establishes how federal agencies create and authorize regulation.
Settlements can create regulation that are a surprise to the regulated community and the
public. The APA requires a notice and comment period as well as a regulation impact
statement and other analytical reports.182 Sue-and-settle often cuts out public participation
and is viewed, by some, as a violation of the APA.183 As stated previously, activist
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groups who adopt a sue-and-settle policy were more likely to incorporate a public notice
and comment period in settlements; especially during the Obama administration.184 The
Supreme Court has ruled that resource and some procedural cases are beyond the purview
of the APA and therefore, are not in the courts’ jurisdiction to review.185 The courts will
only review the agency’s final actions, and so only review settlements once regulation is
finalized. Thus, the APA is either an ineffective way to regulate sue-and-settle or the sueand-settle cases appear to circumvent the point of the law.186

The Equal Access to Justice Act
The EAJA applies to businesses, individuals and nonprofit organizations that
prevail in litigation against the federal government.187 The act forces the government to
pay for people to sue them. The EAJA reduces the cost of suing; when the cost of an
action is reduced, the most likely outcome is that the demand for the good is increased.
Thus, with the EAJA reducing the cost of suing the EPA, there has been a dramatic
increase in the number of lawsuits instigated against the agency.
As shown in the Revolving Payments section of this paper, the EAJA creates a
relationship between the agency and the activist groups. The EAJA attempts to solve the
184
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problem of only the rich seeking justice through litigation and to allow for more balanced
outcomes in settlements.188 The EAJA, though, can simply act as a transfer of wealth
from the government to special interest groups.189 Special interest groups seeking private
advantage, use the EAJA to support their case for wealth transfer under the guise of
enforcing legislation.190 Under the Bush Administration, “sweetheart deals” were made
with industry groups where former colleagues of the agency would be invited to sue the
agency with the purpose of creating policy.191 The Obama administration has similarly
been accused of creating “green sweetheart” deals through the sue-and-settle policy and
then sweetening the deal by awarding attorney fees. 192 Additionally, by allowing the cost
of litigation to be covered by the government, Congress may have incentivized citizen
suits beyond the ideal threshold for litigation.193
The payments made due to litigation, do not come directly from the agency’s
budget. Rather, the fees are paid from the Department of the Treasury’s Judgement Fund,
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and the Department of Justice defends the EPA in all lawsuits.194 In litigation, fees are
applied to curb certain behavior by the defendant. If the EPA is not paying the litigation
fees, whether in time spent at court or in payments, then the agency does not have any
reason to prevent its bad behavior.195
The increase in sue-and-settle lawsuits caused by the EAJA then may not be
doing what Congress intended: monitoring agency behavior, ensuring deadlines, and
improving the quality of regulations. If the agency does not have to pay for misconduct,
then sue-and-settle will continue to act only as enforcement on the agency after litigation;
the agency will not fulfill its duties without constant supervision. Thus, the law, rather
than acting as a constraint on the agency by increasing costs for not completing its
responsibility in a timely manner, only adds to society’s perception of ineffective
legislation and a disorderly agency; especially if their behavior is viewed with the idea
that collusion is occurring. As the courts are either unwilling, or unable, to authorize a
definitive answer to use of citizen suits and the EAJA, these problems will continue.
The sue-and-settle policy will have a lasting effect on the law; whether it is by the
regulatory overreach, the distortion of the purpose of the courts, or a loss of respect for
the regulatory process. In a letter to Scott Pruitt, former EPA officials pointed out the
debate on the sue-and-settle policy is skewed; whether collusion occurs or not, there will
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always be litigation and settlements that result in regulation.196 Settlements have both
positive and negative effects on the court system and the law. However, it is the
perception that collusion exists, distorting the actions of the legislature, judiciary, and
EPA, that may cause more critical issues with society.

CONCLUSION

Approximately a year ago, Scott Pruitt, EPA director, announced an end to the use
of sue-and-settle. Though some are skeptical that ending the practice will result in reform
and not harm of the regulatory process,197 others laud Pruitt for taking a step toward
transparency.198 To change the agency’s behavior, lessen the load of sue-and-settle cases,
and prevent litigation for deadline suits, Congress would need to incentivize the agency
to effectively perform its duties in a timely fashion. Only when the policy of sue-andsettle is no longer beneficial to both parties will the practice end.
This paper found a variety of alternative theories for the close relationship
established between the parties in sue-and-settle cases. Further research is needed to
establish whether the relationship is collusive or not. This paper focused on those
plaintiffs that filed a large number of suits between 2000-2010. Evidence of collusion
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may be more effectively explored by extending the dataset to include settlements through
2018. An interesting idea for further research is to compare the Obama and Trump
administrations and identify what effects loss of the sue-and-settle policy has had on the
courts, Congress, and the EPA. Additionally, research could be done on why certain laws
remain encouraging sue-and-settle. Understanding the different incentives behind the
laws could help answer the question of why sue-and-settle exists.
The recent increase in sue-and-settle suits over the past years, may be what is
raising the profile of issues with the policy. Low numbers of sue-and-settle cases could
help maintain a balance of power by enforcing deadline suits and encouraging agency
duties. However, current institutions have created incentives for special interest groups to
inundate the agency with a plethora of suits in recent years. This has caused numerous
issues as discussed for both the agency and the court system. Most of their actions are
distorted from the perception that collusion occurs between the parties in litigation and,
despite numerous studies showing no collusion exists, this perception persists.

56
REFERENCES

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012).
Amadeo, Kimberly. "This Bailout Made Bernanke Angrier than Anything Else in the
Recession." The Balance Small Business. Accessed September 30, 2018.
https://www.thebalance.com/aig-bailout-cost-timeline-bonuses-causes-effects3305693.
American Farm Bureau Federation v. EPA, No.11-cv-0067, MD Penn., Complaint
(January 2011).
American Farm Bureau Federation v. EPA, No. 13-4079, 3d Cir, Opinion (July 6, 2015).
American Farm Bureau Federation v. EPA. SCOTUSblog. October 09, 2018. Accessed
October 09, 2018. http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/american-farmbureau-federation-v-epa/.
Bedard, Paul, and Pablo Martinez Monsivais. "Regulatory Scheme Killed by EPA's Scott
Pruitt Cost Taxpayers $68 Billion." Washington Examiner. October 24, 2017.
Accessed May 06, 2018. https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/regulatoryscheme-killed-by-epas-scott-pruitt-cost-taxpayers-68-billion/article/2638414.
Bhagat, Sanjai, John Bizjak, and Jeffrey L. Coles. "The Shareholder Wealth Implications
of Corporate Lawsuits." Financial Management 1998, vol. 27, no. 4, pg.5-27.
Accessed October 3, 2018. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3666410.
Black, Henry Campbell, Joseph R. Nolan, and Michael J. Connolly. Black Law
Dictionary: Definitions of the Terms and Phrases of American and English
Jurisprudence, Ancient and Modern 1979, 2nd ed, pg.12. St. Paul, MN: West
Publ.
Bosch, Dan. "EPA's Sue-and-settle Directive: A Step Toward Transparency." American
Action Forum. October 24, 2017. Accessed May 06, 2018.
https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/epas-sue-settle-directive-steptoward-transparency/.
Buchanan, James McGill. Politics without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public Choice
Theory and Its Normative Implications. 1984.
Bundy, Stephen McG., “The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary System.”
Hastings Law Journal, 1992, vol.44, no.1. Accessed October 3, 2018.

57
https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2000&context=f
acpubs.
Butler, Henry N., and Nathaniel J. Harris. "Sue, Settle, and Shut Out the States:
Destroying the Environmental Benefits of Cooperative Federalism." Harvard
Journal Of Law and Policy 37, no. 2 (October 21, 2013). Accessed October 3,
2018. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2343273.
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1970).
Downs, Carolyn. "What Is the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA)?" CCK Law. April
02, 2018. Accessed October 01, 2018. https://cck-law.com/news/equal-access-tojustice-act-eaja/.
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1973).
"Environmental Litigation: Cases against EPA and Associated Costs over Time." U.S.
Government Accountability Office (U.S. GAO). August 31, 2011. Accessed
October 01, 2018. https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-650.
"Environmental Litigation: Impact of Deadline Suits on EPA's Rulemaking Is Limited."
U.S. Government Accountability Office (U.S. GAO). January 14, 2015. Accessed
May 06, 2018. https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-34.
Ferguson, Janette L., and Laura K. Granier. "Sue and Settle: Citizen Suit Settlements and
Environmental Law." Natural Resources and Environment, 2015, vol.30, no. 1.
https://www.americanbar.org/publications/natural_resources_environment/201516/summer/sue_and_settle_citizen_suit_settlements_and_environmental_law.htm
l.
Freedom of Information Act Request. "Settlements Between 1/20/2009 and 1/19/2017
Involving the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act or Endangered Species Act."
Department of Justice Environment and Natural Resources Division. August 08,
2017. Accessed September 29, 2018.
https://cfpub.epa.gov/compliance/cases/index.cfm?sortby=DESCRIPTION.
Fowler v. EPA, No. 1:09-00005, DDC, Complaint (Jan. 5, 2009).
"Government Agencies Allow Corporations To Write off Billions In Federal Settlement
Payments." United States Public Interest Research Group Education Fund.
December 03, 2015. Accessed October 06, 2018.
https://uspirg.org/news/usf/government-agencies-allow-corporations-writebillions-federal-settlement-payments.

58
H.R. Conf. Rep. 96-1434, at 20-27 (1980) Conference committee report on Pub. L. No.
96-481, The Small Business Export Expansion Act of 1980, of which Title II is
the Equal Access to Justice Act.
Harris, Berger, LLP, and Samuel D. Brickley, II. "Businesslawbasics.com." Chapter 19:
Uniform Commercial Code. 2013. Accessed September 29, 2018.
http://www.businesslawbasics.com/chapter-9-steps-civil-case.
In re Endangered Species Act Section 4 Deadline Litig.-MDL, No, 10-00377, DCC,
Complaint (May 5, 2011).
In re Endangered Species Act Section 4 Deadline Litig.-MDL, No. 2165, 704 F.3d.,
Opinion (DC Cir., 2013).
Joe Stephens and Carol D. Leonnig, “Solyndra Loan Deal: Warning about Legality Came
from within Obama Administration,” Washington Post. Accessed Oct. 7, 2018,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/solyndra-obama-and-rahm-emanuelpushed-to-spotlight-energy-company/2011/10/07/gIQACDqSTL_story.html.
Johnson, Stephen M., “Sue-and-settle: Demonizing the Environmental Citizen Suit.”
Seattle University Law Review, 2014, vol. 37, no. 891. Accessed September 30,
2018, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2478866.
Judge Wilkey Dissenting Opinion, Citizens for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch, 718
F.2d 1136, D.C. Circuit (1983).
Kovacs, William L., Keith W. Holman, and Jonathan A. Jackson. "Sue-and-settle:
Regulating Behind Closed Doors." U.S. Chamber of Commerce. May 2013.
Accessed May 06, 2018. https://www.uschamber.com/report/sue-and-settleregulating-behind-closed-doors.
Kovacs, William L., Keith W. Holman, Joseph J. Johnson, and Jordan Crenshaw. "Sueand-settle Updated: Damage Done 2013-2016." U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
May 2017. Accessed May 06, 2018. https://www.uschamber.com/report/sue-andsettle-updated-damage-done-2013-2016.
Lawrence Susskind & Gerard McMahon, “The Theory and Practice of Negotiated
Rulemaking,” Yale J. on Reg. 1985, vol.134.
Local Number 93 v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063, 3076 (1986).
Mahoney, Paul G. "The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be
Right." The Journal of Legal Studies, 2001, vol. 30, no. 2. Accessed October 3,
2018. https://ssrn.com/abstract=206809.

59

McMunigal, Kevin C., "The Costs of Settlement: The Impact of Scarcity of Adjudication
on Litigating Lawyers.” Faculty Publications, 1990. Accessed October 3, 2018.
http://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/351.
McVean, Courtney and Pidot, Justin R., “Environmental Settlements and Administrative
Law.” Harvard Environmental Law Review 2015; U Denver Legal Studies
Research Paper no. 14-25. Accessed September 30, 2018.
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2425990.
Memorandum from the Attorney General, Department Policy Concerning Consent
Decrees and Settlement Agreements (March 13, 1986).
Michael Mandel, “German and French Banks Got $36 Billion from AIG Bailout,”
Bloomberg Businessweek “Econochat,” Accessed September 15, 2018,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2009-03-14/german-and-french-banksgot-36-billion-from-aig-bailout.
Niskanen, William A. "The Peculiar Economics of Bureaucracy." The American
Economic Review 1968, vol.58, no. 2. Accessed September 30, 2018,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1831817.
Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073 (1984).
Percival, Robert V. "The Bounds of Consent: Consent Decrees, Settlements and Federal
Environmental Policy Making." University of Chicago Legal Forum 1987, no. 1.
Accessed September 28, 2018.
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol1987/iss1/13.
Pruitt, Scott. "Administrator Pruitt Issues Directive to End EPA "Sue & Settle"." EPA.
October 16, 2017. Accessed May 06, 2018.
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/administrator-pruitt-issues-directive-end-epasue-settle.
"Response to Directive on Consent Decrees and Settlements." Letter to Scott Pruitt.
November 13, 2017. Accessed October 6, 2018.
http://environment.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Response-toDirective-re-Consent-Decrees-and-Settlements.pdf.
"Revolving Door: Environmental Protection Agency." OpenSecrets.org. Accessed
October 01, 2018.
https://www.opensecrets.org/revolving/search_result.php?agency=Environmental
Protection Agency&id=EIEPA.

60
Schwartz, Joanna C. "How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police
Reform." UCLA Law Review, 2016, vol. 63. Accessed October 3, 2018.
https://www.uclalawreview.org/how-governments-pay-lawsuits-budgets-andpolice-reform/.
Settlement Agreement, Fowler v. EPA, No. 09-00005, DDC, (May 19, 2010).
Settlement Agreement, In re Endangered Species Act Section 4 Deadline Litig.-MDL,
No, 10-00377, DCC, (May 5, 2011).
Shaw, Jane S. "Public Choice Theory." Library of Economics and Liberty. 2002.
Accessed September 30, 2018.
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/PublicChoiceTheory.html.
Silva, Diana A. "Settlement Negotiations and Public Disclosure Laws." The Legal
Intelligencer. July 25, 2016. Accessed October 06, 2018.
https://www.law.com/thelegalintelligencer/almID/1202763357348/settlementnegotiations-and-public-disclosure-laws/.
Sunshine for Regulatory Decrees and Settlements Act of 2015, House Report 114-184,
June 25, 2015, 114-1, S. 378, 114th Cong., Senator Chuck Grassley (2015).
"The Basics of the Regulatory Process." EPA. September 25, 2018. Accessed September
30, 2018. https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/basics-regulatoryprocess#regulation.
"The Economics and History of Cronyism." Mercatus Center. July 26, 2012. pg.9-14.
Accessed September 30, 2018. https://www.mercatus.org/publication/economicsand-history-cronyism.
Tyson, Ben. "An Empirical Analysis of Sue-and-Settle in Environmental Litigation."
Virginia Law Review. November 2014. Accessed May 06, 2018.
http://www.virginialawreview.org/volumes/content/empirical-analysis-sue-andsettle-environmental-litigation.
Voyles, Travis A. "Clearing Up Perceived Problems with the Sue-and-Settle Issue in
Environmental Litigation." Land Use and Environmental Law Journal. March 08,
2015. Accessed September 29, 2018.
https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/jluenvl31&div=1
6&id=&page=.
U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Minority Office: House,
Senate Lawmakers Highlight Concerns with EPA Sue & Settle Tactic for
Backdoor Regulation (2012).

61

Weiner, Rachel. "Solyndra, Explained." The Washington Post. June 01, 2012. Accessed
September 30, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/thefix/post/solyndra-explained/2012/06/01/gJQAig2g6U_blog.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.72fa2
36273a2.
Li, Yan-Xin. "Tax Consequences of Litigation Damages and Settlements." Association of
Corporate Counsel. Accessed October 06, 2018.
https://www.acc.com/legalresources/quickcounsel/litigation-damages-andsettlements.cfm#hid5.
Zywicki, Todd J. "Spontaneous Order and the Common Law: Gordon Tullock's
Critique." Public Choice 2008, vol.135, no. 1/2.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/27698249.

63

APPENDICES

63
APPENDEX A: MODEL INFORMATION

Table 3 shows a summary of each model’s statistics. As shown, the models vary
widely across all statistics suggesting the relationships are largely affected by the type of
model used.

Table A-1: Summary of Statistics by Model
Min

1st Qu

Median

Mean

3rd Qu

Max

LPM[1]

-1.95304

-0.09817

0.00000

-0.13445

0.00000

1.03692

LPM [2]

-1.2816

-0.07106

-0.01158

0.02307

0.14979

1.13066

LPM [3]

0.000699

0.071003

0.141306

0.141306

0.211610

0.281914

Probit [1]

-20.2315

-0.6778

0.0000

-0.8962

0.0000

16.4752

Probit [2] -18.90108

-0.15579

-0.02366

1.16982

4.79583

17.68627

Probit [3] -0.576468 -0.431907 -0.287347 -0.287347 -0.142787 0.001773
Logit [1]

-67.82693

-1.26856

0.00001

-2.20805

0.00001

59.53752

Logit [2]

-60.56700

-0.31527

-0.05846

4.50460

18.29193

59.51504

Logit [3]

-0.934944 -0.700353 -0.465761 -0.465761

-0.23117

0.003422

To understand which model is the best fit, the AIC and BIC scores for each model
is shown in table A-2 for equation 1 and table A-3 for equation 2. The AIC scores for the
LPM models are the lowest. Thus, the LPM coefficients will be used in analysis of the
relationships between settlement, time, plaintiffs, and court.

64
Table A-2: Comparison of Model AIC/BIC Scores Eq. 1

lpm1
probit1
logit1

AIC

BIC

Sample Size

DF

296.3186
870.51
870.3709

1936.968
2497.642
2497.498

670
670
670

309
309
309

Table A-3: Comparison of Model AIC/BIC Scores Eq. 2
AIC
BIC
Sample Size DF
lpm1
813.7245 2449.866
670
308
probit1 964.0295 2595.664
670
308
logit1
963.1442 2594.779
670
308

Table A-4 shows the model coefficients and standard errors for the courts that had a
statistically significant impact on a settlement occurring within 6 months. Refer to table
2 for other results.
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Table A-4: Model Coefficients and Standard Errors for Equation 1 (Courts)
Total
LPM
Probit
Logit
Cases
Circuit 5
-0.9017
-7.48
-23.76
12
0.21595
4087.00
29230.00
Circuit 7
-1.0512
-12.78
-43.16
4
0.1038`
4549.00
32790.00
Circuit 9
-1.0233
-8.20
-25.10
36
0.12143
4087.00
29230.00
Circuit 10
-0.9876
-12.54
-41.91
18
0.09009
4216.00
30290.00
Circuit 11
-1.0167
-12.67
-42.58
8
0.97413
4348.00
31290.00
D. Montana
-1.0314
-7.75
-25.25
3
0.13307
5027.00
36110.00
D. New Mexico
-1.1062
-12.93
-43.98
3
0.10342
4634.00
33270.00
D. Oregon
-1.0181
-12.74
-42.71
6
0.10088
4340.00
31240.00
D. S. Carolina
-1.0490
-12.77
-43.14
3
0..09410
4543.00
2750.00
S.D. New York
-1.0307
-12.71
-42.81
5
0.11075
4410.00
31780.00
W.D. Wisconsin
-0.88933
-7.49
-23.87
6
0.22875
4087.00
29230.00
All courts in this table were statistically significant at the 1% level on the LPM model.
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